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Intrusive uncertainty in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder + 
Tom Cochrane and Keeley Heaton 
(forthcoming in Mind and Language) 
 
Abstract 
In this article we examine obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). We examine and reject two 
existing models of this disorder: the Dysfunctional Belief Model and the Inference-Based 
Approach. Instead, we propose that the main distinctive characteristic of OCD is a 
hyperactive sub-personal signal of being in error, experienced by the individual as 
uncertainty about his or her intentional actions (including mental actions). This signalling 
interacts with the anxiety sensitivities of the individual to trigger conscious checking 
processes, including speculations about possible harms. We examine the implications of this 
model IRUWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\WRFRQWUROKLVRUKHUWKRXJKWV 
 
Word Count: 12,533 
 
 
1. The Varieties of Thought Control 
There are a variety of ways in which the control of thought may be realised. For instance, 
WKHUH¶s a difference between consciously controlling your thoughts, and thoughts flowing in 
conformity with your goals without you having to consciously worry about it. 7KHUH¶VDOVRa 
difference between actively deciding how your thoughts will go, and merely intervening if 
your thoughts are going wrong somehow. Moreover, what counts as going wrong (or right) 
depends on a variety of norms- some of which may be acquired, and some innate. We may 
care about such features of thoughts as their coherence, speed, accuracy, originality, moral 
goodness and so on. 
 
The form, or method of our thought control activities also falls into a few different sub-types: 
i) we may control the movement from one thought to the next; ii) we may control the extent 
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to which we have thoughts of a certain type (e.g. more creative thoughts); iii) if thoughts are 
the sorts of things that can change properties while remaining the same thoughts, we may try 
to change some of those properties (e.g. to make a thought more vivid, or certain); iv) we 
may finally control which thoughts are consciously attended to, or for how long they occupy 
our attention.  
 
Overall, it is unlikely that any single mental function corresponds to all of these varieties of 
thought-control. The move from one thought to the next, for instance, seems to be governed 
by processes ranging from sheer association, to deductive reasoning, to creative exploration. 
However, it seems to us that being able to direct our attention at will is at the heart of our 
feeling of being in control of our thoughts. Being able to shift our attention to the matters that 
concern us²be they aspects of the world, or the thoughts themselves²is the first step in 
conscious attempts to control the kinds of thoughts we have, or the flow of one thought to the 
next. 
 
UnfortunatelyLWLVWKLVYHU\FDSDFLW\WRGLUHFWRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQWKDWLVGLVUXSWHGLQ individuals 
with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). OCD sufferers constantly attend to possible 
harms that may befall them, or that they might inflict on others, despite their desire not to do 
so. Our hypothesis is that this is caused by the over-activation of a sub-personal system 
responsible for signalling when the individual is in error, or about to be in error. This 
signalling is experienced by the individual as uncertainty about his or her actions (including 
mental actions). It then interacts with the anxiety sensitivities of the individual to stimulate 
conscious checking processes, including speculation about possible harms. The upshot of all 
this is that the LQGLYLGXDO¶V DWWHQWLRQ LV FRQVWDQWO\ SUe-occupied, and understandably, they 
experience considerable distress regarding their inability to control their thoughts. 
 
To fully develop this model of OCD we will examine and reject some alternate models of the 
disorder. These models highlight various pieces of evidence that we must account for, and 
offer suggestions upon which our model builds. This will occupy sections 2-4 of this paper. 
In sections 5 and 6 we will then outline our own account in detail and how it manages to 
account for the various pieces of evidence. Finally in section 7 we will summarise the 
implications of our model for thought control. In particular, the case of OCD reveals some of 
the ways in which our attention is driven by sub-personal factors over which we have little 
conscious control. 
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2. Characterising OCD 
Obsessive compulsive disorder is one of the most common mental disorders. It has a lifetime 
prevalence of approximately 2.3% in the US population (Ruscio et al. 2010) and this 
frequency seems consistent internationally, though of course estimates depend greatly on the 
diagnostic criteria employed (Fontenelle et al. 2006). The disorder develops gradually, with 
an average age of onset of 19.5 years, and is usually chronic if left untreated. Moreover while 
cognitive behavioural therapy and/or anti-anxiety medication can have a very significant 
impact on severity, it is rare for treatment to fully eliminate symptoms, and relapse is 
common (Abramowitz 2009; O¶Connor et al. 2012). 
 
It is noteworthy that while the DSM-IV (1994) classifies OCD as an anxiety disorder, the 
recent DSM-5 (2013) creates a new chapter for OCD and related disorders such as body-
dysmorphic disorder, trichotillomania (hair pulling), excoriation (skin-picking), and 
hoarding.1 Strong connections to anxiety disorders are still recognized however. The 
diagnostic criteria for OCD specify that WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V REVHVVLYH WKRXJKWV should cause 
µmarked anxiety RU GLVWUHVV¶ in most cases, and that their compulsions are aimed at 
µSUHYHQWLQJRUUHGXFLQJDQ[LHW\¶ (DSM-V). Moreover, co-morbidity with an anxiety disorder 
is the norm rather than the exception, with up to 76% of OCD sufferers also displaying either 
social anxiety disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder, or specific phobias 
(DSM-5, cf. Diniz et al. 2012: S82-83).2 Indeed, we will suggest that a background anxiety 
problem is likely to play an important (though not necessary) role in the development of the 
disorder.  
 
Making sense of the connection with anxiety is an important desideratum for models of OCD, 
but differences between OCD and the commonly recognized anxiety disorders mentioned 
above should be recognized. OCD is defined by the twin components of obsessive thoughts 
and compulsive behaviours, neither of which need be found in the commonly recognized 
anxiety disorders. Moreover, where the worries of anxiety sufferers are often of a mundane 
nature (e.g. fear of social embarrassment), the worries of OCD sufferers may be extreme, 
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 Hoarding was classed as a sub-type of OCD in the DSM-IV, but has been recognized as a distinct OCD-related 
disorder in the DSM-5. Hoarding seems to be mainly characterised by distress at the thought of parting with an 
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2
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characterised by improbable causal attributions (e.g. blasphemous thoughts may make God 
kill a loved one; the photo of a dog may be infectious), and are often fixated on certain 
distinctive themes. These themes include 1) worries about harming other people; 2) worries 
about violating social or religious taboos; 3) worries about the threat of contagious disease 
and; 4) worries that one has failed to secure against a potential hazard (e.g. whether one has 
remembered to lock the front door). The compulsions meanwhile may vary greatly and can 
include both behaviours that are somewhat rational in light of the obsessive theme, such as 
hand-washing or repeatedly checking that an appliance has been turned off, and behaviours of 
a more superstitious nature such as placing items in a very specific order or mentally 
rehearsing lists. 
 
Compulsive behaviours play an important definitional role in the clinical diagnosis of OCD 
since treatment is often sought when compulsions are taken to such an extreme that normal 
day-to-day functioning is impaired. However, we should not understand OCD as an impulse 
disorder along the same lines as Tourette¶s syndrome. While some compulsive behaviours 
may, due to habitual repetition, become fairly unconscious or automatic, the OCD sufferer is 
in many ways the opposite of impulsive. As Kevin Zaragoza (2006) argues, it is not that OCD 
sufferers possess a weak will that is easily overwhelmed or bypassed. Rather OCD 
behaviours arise from the exhaustive pressure to relieve constant obsessive worries. It is 
because of excessive concern regarding harms to oneself or others that the behaviours are, in 
a sense, well-motivated (for instance, sufferers with harm-to-other obsessive themes never 
actually harm their loved ones, they take excessive precautions to avoid doing so). Similarly, 
while superstitious rituals may appear unreasonable, they may be explained as a more or less 
desperate means to gain a sense of control over the threats haunting the OCD sufferer.3 Such 
behaviours satisfy a cognitive demand to do something about the worries, and this control-
gaining function is likely to be shared with other more µrational¶ compulsive behaviours. 
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 Boyer and Liénard (2006) make the interesting suggestion that perfectionistic ordering may be the product of 
an evolved precautionary mechanism, since intruders to a very ordered environment can be detected more 
readily. While this mechanism plausibly explains why ordering, as a general type of behaviour, may be triggered 
in response to feelings of vulnerability, it could hardly be a rational response to the actual environments 
confronting OCD sufferers, and again serves mainly as a salve for feelings of anxiety. 
5 
 
Thus compulsive behaviours should in general be understood as driven by the goal to 
µneutralise¶ the obsessive thoughts,4 and it is for this reason that explanations for the disorder 
tend to focus on the obsessive aspects of OCD. In particular, a central task for any model of 
OCD is to make sense of the intrusive nature of obsessive thoughts. OCD sufferers recognize 
that their obsessive thoughts are their own, (unlike perhaps, schizophrenic patients). Yet they 
are often aware that the thoughts are irrational, and certainly experience them as unwanted 
and distressing. Despite their desire to rid themselves of such thoughts however, they feel 
compelled to actively engage with them by means of introspective or behavioural checking 
processes. 
 
In this article, we identify three main strategies to account for this phenomenon, all of which 
make sense of obsession or µover-thinking¶ in different ways: The Dysfunctional Belief 
Model regards OCD as an emotional disorder concerning the evaluation of thoughts. The 
individual takes certain thoughts too seriously and this leads to rumination upon them. 
Meanwhile the Inference-Based Approach takes OCD to be a cognitive disorder relating to 
delusional commitments and irrational confirmation processes. This leads the individual to 
generate imaginary narratives that confirm suspected harms. Finally, there are views 
appealing WRDJHQHUDOFRJQLWLYHSUREOHPLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHQVHRIFHUWDLQW\Exactly how 
this uncertainty problem is construed varies between researchers, but a distinctive claim is 
that the LQGLYLGXDO¶Vuncertainty fails to be dispelled by checking activities. On our model, 
which we call the Intrusive Uncertainty Model, a hyperactive signal of uncertainty intrudes 
upon the consciousness of the individual. The downstream effects of this dysfunction include 
the generation of imagined harms (as identified in the inference based approach) and the 
formation of dysfunctional concerns (as identified in the dysfunctional belief model). 
 
3. Dysfunctional Beliefs 
The Dysfunctional Belief Model of OCD, derived from Beck¶s 1976 cognitive model of 
mental disorder, is currently the dominant theoretical approach in the psychological literature. 
It focuses primarily on the disordered evaluation of thoughts, arguing that it is because the 
OCD patient takes certain thoughts too seriously, or as presenting scenarios that may actually 
occur, that they then have difficulty dismissing them. 
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 Freeston and Ladouceur (19GH¿QHQHXWUDOLVLQJDVµa voluntary, effortful cognitive or behavioural act 
that is directed at removing, preventing and attenuating the intrusive thought DQGWKHDVVRFLDWHGGLVFRPIRUW¶
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A key claim of this model is that the intrusive thoughts reported by OCD sufferers lie on a 
continuum with ordinary cognition. It is widely agreed that everyone occasionally 
experiences thoughts of an intrusive nature (for a review see Berry and Laskey 2012). We 
know we have the capacity to harm others or to violate social norms, and so it is 
understandable that thoughts reflecting this knowledge strike us from time to time. In the 
same way it is healthy to be vigilant to potential dangers, even to the extent of imagining 
improbable catastrophes on occasion. Furthermore, when confronted with particularly 
disturbing mental images (for instance from a news story, or a nightmare) it can often take 
weeks for rumination on such images to fade away. Yet while in ordinary cases, thoughts of 
harm or taboo-violation are normally stimulated by environmental cues, it seems that OCD 
sufferers experience such thoughts at any time, and at a frequency and extremity of content 
far exceeding the norm (Clark and Purdon 1995; Julien, O¶Connor and Aardema, 2007). 
 
The Dysfunctional Belief Model makes sense of this extremity of intrusive thinking by 
appeal to the possession of dysfunctional beliefs that encourage OCD sufferers to respond in 
an exaggerated way to ordinary intrusive thoughts. More precisely, these dysfunctional 
beliefs should be understood as background attitudes or concerns. The claim is that if one has 
a strong background concern regarding say, the duty to take care of one¶s children, one will 
become particularly distressed if a stray thought about actively harming one¶s children comes 
to mind. Such an attitude does not seem particularly distinctive however. Thus more recent 
versions of the dysfunctional belief model appeal to concerns directed at the thoughts 
themselves- i.e. metacognitive attitudes (Wells 1997; Clark 2004). OCD sufferers seem to 
regard the mere occurrence of a thought about harm as meriting anxiety or moral 
condemnation. It has also been suggested that this metacognitive attitude reflects belief in 
what is known as µthought-action fusion¶ (Rachman 1997); the OCD subject has the irrational 
belief that thoughts can directly influence events, and/or that they are equivalent to actions. 
 
In general, triggering an emotional reaction requires both a target stimulus and a background 
concern that the target is recognized as impacting. In this model of OCD, it is neither the 
target intrusive thoughts nor the responses that are dysfunctional (at least initially), but the 
concerns that drive those responses. The OCD sufferer has the unrealistic expectation that 
they should have only good and peaceful thoughts, and this unrealistic expectation leads to 
suffering and distress when it inevitably fails to be met. As with any other emotional reaction, 
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distress will then tend to arouse attention towards the target (re-activating the intrusive 
thought) and to motivate preventative behaviours. However, trying to suppress a thought 
tends not to work. It tends instead to maintain the thought, just as asking someone to not 
think of a white bear encourages them to think of a white bear.5 What healthy individuals 
might then realise is that such explicit attempts do not work, and allow themselves to be 
distracted by something else. Yet OCD subjects seem not to learn this lesson (Najmi et al. 
2010 even provides some experimental confirmation of this learning difference). Instead, the 
inability to dispel the thought is believed to create further distress, fuelling a vicious cycle of 
obsessive attempts at self-control, and ultimately the compulsive behaviour. Similarly, acting 
to neutralise the obsessive thought by means of outward preventative behaviours reinforces 
the subject¶s memory and awareness of the obsessive content, while also strengthening the 
association between the obsessive thought and its behavioural output. 
 
The treatment currently favoured for OCD also reflects the understanding of OCD as an 
emotional disorder involving dysfunctional concerns. Exposure Response Prevention therapy 
works by getting the individual with OCD to think of the matter that distresses them, while 
encouraging them to resist compulsive behaviours, or attempts at thought suppression (in the 
case of Wells¶ 2009 metacognitive variety of this approach to treatment). That is, the OCD 
obsession is treated somewhat like a phobic reaction towards certain thoughts, on the 
assumption that like a phobic fear, if the subject gradually habituates him- or herself towards 
the presence of the thought without engaging in neutralising responses, the aversive 
emotional responses will be gradually extinguished. 
 
The main evidence in favour of the Dysfunctional Belief Model comes from self-reports of 
OCD sufferers. Subjects need not be explicitly aware of possessing a dysfunctional belief, but 
they typically display a pattern of beliefs or attitudes in response to questionnaires that 
suggest the presence of certain underlying attitudes. In probably the largest study of its kind 
(Taylor et al. 2010, surveying more than 5000 people) factor analysis of these self-reports has 
been used to identify 3 core dysfunctional belief domains: 1) Inflated personal responsibility 
and the overestimation of threat; 2) Perfectionism and the intolerance of uncertainty and; 3) 
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Over importance of thoughts and the need to control these thoughts.6 It should be noted 
however that these three factors could only account for 23% of the variance amongst OCD 
sufferers. Taylor et al. also show that the thought-control factor is statistically correlated to 
some degree with all the other factors identified, supporting the claim that the dysfunctional 
beliefs are particularly focused on metacognitive attitudes. 
 
Overall, while we agree that dysfunctional beliefs could plausibly account for the obsessive 
reinforcement of certain intrusive thoughts, we do not believe that this model provides a 
sufficient characterisation of the disorder. The biggest problem is that not all individuals with 
OCD report a strong commitment to any dysfunctional beliefs. A significant sub-group of 
OCD sufferers report that their compulsive behaviours are driven by feelings that things are 
µnot just right¶ somehow, rather than beliefs in say, the likelihood of contamination (e.g. 
Coles et al. 2005). On the questionnaire methods used by belief theorists to infer the presence 
of dysfunctional beliefs, this sub-group displays belief scores comparable to healthy subjects 
(Taylor et al. 2006). One possible response to this evidence is to simply allow for a distinct 
sub-group of OCD sufferers. However, the similarities in compulsive behaviours across the 
major obsessive themes (i.e. washing, checking, ordering), as well as a comparable sense of 
intrusiveness for both the feeling that things are not right and explicit obsessive concerns, 
suggest that there is a common root to these sub-types that does not rely on underlying 
dysfunctional beliefs. 
 
We can also question whether the identified dysfunctional beliefs are the cause or the 
consequence of the specific OCD obsessions (cf. Julien et al. 2007). Plausibly, suffering from 
obsessive thoughts leads to greater endorsement of the importance of such thoughts or the 
need to control them. Similarly, if one were unable to rid oneself of thoughts of harming 
one¶s loved ones, one may well be prone to overestimate the threat one bears towards others. 
Given that it is common to infer possibility from conceivability, the greater frequency with 
which harms are imagined, or the inability to imagine otherwise, is likely to strengthen the 
subject¶s beliefs that harms may occur unless preventative measures are taken. 
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 Cf. the same finding by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (2005). Note that this study 
worked with both OCD sufferers and non-clinical individuals, while the Taylor et al. (2010) study worked with 
obsessive compulsive symptoms in a non-OCD population. 
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Difficulties concerning what-causes-what are particular acute for models of OCD because it 
is often recognized to be a disorder characterised by vicious cycles of mutually reinforcing 
symptoms and evaluative attitudes. As such it will always be difficult to establish a single 
generating factor that gets the cycle moving. At any rate, the Dysfunctional Belief Model 
requires some explanation of where the dysfunctional beliefs come from that is more 
defensible than an account in which obsessive thinking appears prior to dysfunctional beliefs. 
Since OCD is known to develop gradually, it is possible to appeal to the sheer accumulation 
of mutually reinforcing beliefs and attitudes. But in order to explain why such large numbers 
of people suffer from OCD, the development of these beliefs could hardly be a matter of 
chance, especially given the consideration that everyday experience should repeatedly 
disconfirm factually improbable sources of harm or magical thought control. 
 
Thus it is usual for dysfunctional belief theorists to appeal to formative life experiences in 
which danger or misbehaviour are highlighted, encouraging inflated beliefs concerning 
personal responsibility or vulnerability to develop (e.g. Taylor et al. 2011). In support, it is 
observed that life circumstances in which responsibilities are increased, such as pregnancy, 
are risk factors for developing OCD (Abramowitz et al. 2007).  
 
Yet while special life-circumstances may be risk factors for the development of OCD, they 
seem neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of the disorder. Plenty of people 
suffer strict upbringings or personal trauma without developing OCD, and plenty of people 
develop OCD without such background experiences (at least of an unusual kind that would be 
sufficient to differentiate the OCD population from the non-OCD population) (cf. Grisham et 
al. 2011). Experimental manipulations of responsibility (e.g. setting a task in which the 
subject is given increased responsibility for ensuring that a stove is turned off) have also been 
found to increase checking behaviours more in OCD subjects than controls, with 
accompanying deteriorations in confidence regarding memories (Boschen and Vuksanovic 
2007, cf. Bouchard, Rhéaume and Ladouceur 1999). While this evidence supports the claim 
that dysfunctional concerns regarding responsibility may mediate obsessive checking 
symptoms in some cases, it also suggests that an underlying condition is making OCD 
sufferers more sensitive to conditions of increased responsibility than healthy individuals. 
 
A further problem with the Dysfunctional Belief Model is that while clusters of beliefs and 
evaluative attitudes may be robust and mutually reinforcing, we should still predict that 
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cognitive-behavioural therapy could unpick these dysfunctional attitudes with more success 
than is currently observed. The degree of severity and resistance to treatment displayed in 
many cases of OCD suggests that a more fundamental affective or cognitive problem is 
fuelling the development of the disorder. 
 
Overall, it is difficult to rely solely on life-history factors in the development of OCD. While 
we are happy to allow dysfunctional belief to play an immediate role in the evaluation of 
intrusive thoughts, at least in some cases, it seems that an additional vulnerability is required 
to power the development and maintenance of the dysfunctional belief, especially in more 
severe cases of the disorder. It is moreover known that there is a significant genetic factor in 
the appearance of OCD. The DSM-5 reports that there is a 0.57 concordance rate in 
monozygotic twins, and that first-degree relatives of individuals with childhood-onset OCD 
are 10 times more likely to have the disorder. It is advisable then to explore neurobiological 
factors that mediate the appearance of the disorder. Such factors could conceivably stretch to 
biases towards magical thinking, but they are more probably associated with basic affective 
and cognitive processing differences. 
 
4. The Search for Harms 
As an alternative to the Dysfunctional Belief Model, Kieron O¶Connor and various 
collaborators (e.g. O¶Connor and Robillard 1995; O¶Connor et al. 2005; O¶Connor et al. 
2012) propose what they call an µInference-Based Approach¶. A distinctive feature of this 
model is its denial that the intrusive thoughts of OCD sufferers lie on a smooth continuum 
with ordinary cognition. If there were such a smooth continuum, they argue, we would expect 
ordinary intrusive thoughts to reflect basically the same content as OCD thoughts. Yet in a 
study conducted by Clark and O¶Connor (2005), only 11% of the intrusive thoughts reported 
by non-OCD subjects related to the distinctive themes reported by OCD subjects (though 
such a study depends a great deal on how broadly one defines the themes). 
 
Instead, O¶Connor and colleagues suggest that individuals with OCD have a cognitive 
disorder that causes distressing thoughts to appear more frequently. If this is the case, 
additional dysfunctional beliefs may not be required to turn intrusive thoughts into 
obsessions; the subject¶s thoughts are already generated in an obsessive manner. In particular, 
O¶Connor and colleagues claim that the OCD sufferer is led to their obsessive thoughts 
because they are overly invested in imaginary possibilities, which come to dominate their 
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thinking by a process they call µinverse inference¶. The OCD sufferer begins with a doubt²
that an imagined harm is available, or that they might be a terrible person. They then 
hypothesize ways in which this possibility could be realised, which must be pre-emptively 
avoided or managed. So for example, a person suffering contagion-themed obsessions 
constantly suspects that there is something infectious in their environment. If they look at the 
handrail or pole on the bus, they are acutely aware that infected people may have touched it, 
and consequently assume that it is probably infectious. Such inferences can be even more 
extreme: The subject has a persistent fear that they could catch rabies. They look at a photo of 
a dog, and hypothesize that the person who took the picture was infected with rabies by the 
dog, and that this infection then (somehow) spread to the magazine carrying the picture. In 
this way the OCD sufferer¶s judgements about themselves or the environment they inhabit 
may be reached not on the basis of neutral evaluations of the empirical evidence at hand, but 
by means of imaginary causal narratives, heavily biased towards confirming the initial doubt. 
 
Since on O¶Connor¶s model the obsession stems from the initial doubt, some account of 
where these doubts come from is required. Here O¶Connor and colleagues appeal to 
delusional µcore beliefs¶ that certain harms are possible, or that the subject could possess a 
certain undesirable character trait (e.g. 1995: 888; 2005: 3). So it turns out that the initial 
doubts are not so much doubts as definite commitments to possibilities. In this way the 
Inference-Based Approach captures quite well the striking way in which OCD sufferers are 
absorbed with possible harms that others recognize as obviously implausible or imaginary. 
7KH SUHVHQFH RI GHOXVLRQDO EHOLHIV FRXOG KHOS WR H[SODLQ WKH 2&' VXIIHUHU¶V UHVLVWDQFH WR
ordinary disconfirmation. 
 
In defending their model, 2¶&RQQRU DQG FROOHDJXHV note their success in treating chronic 
OCD sufferers that have been particularly resistant to traditional cognitive behavioural 
therapies 2¶&RQQRU and 5RELOODUG  2¶&RQQRU HW DO  -198).7 In accordance 
with their model, the treatment method employed involves a twin-pronged strategy: First the 
therapist helps the patient to gain insight into the ways in which they develop imaginary 
narratives supporting their obsessive theme, noting the ways in which the patient ignores 
relevant evidence that they rely on in nearly all other circumstances. Second, the patient is 
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 6HHDOVR2¶&RQQRUHW DO 141-144 which details a study showing improved results using the inference 
EDVHGDSSURDFKRYHUWUDGLWLRQDOFRJQLWLYHEHKDYLRXUDOWKHUDS\1RWHWKDW2¶&RQQRUDQGFROOHDJXHVGRQRWFODLP
that these treatments provide a complete cure. 
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encouraged to rehearse alternate imaginary narratives that do not support the obsessive 
theme. 
 
The problem with this evidence, however, is that the treatment fails to distinctly pick out a 
delusional commitment as the primary cause of OCD. Rehearsing an alternate narrative may 
well be useful for starving an obsession of attention, but it reflects nothing about where the 
obsession comes from. Rather it helps to prevent obsessions that have already taken root from 
further festering in the mind of the patient. A similar point can be made about the other strand 
of the therapy. The theory we outline below agrees that the OCD sufferer is engaged in the 
active elaboration of possible harms. Thus gaining insight into the ways this happens could 
be beneficial for the patient. However the effectiveness of this treatment may be because 
irrational thinking exacerbates the disorder (as we claim) and not because irrational thinking 
is its URRWDV2¶&RQQRUDQGFROOHDJXHVFODLP 
 
In addition to their clinical case studies, 2¶&RQQRU DQG FROOHDJXHV SUHVHQW HYLGHQFH from 
questionnaire studies in which OCD sufferers are more likely than controls and anxiety 
sufferers to display what is called µinferential confusion¶; they affirm statements indicating 
the enhanced commitment WRLPDJLQDU\VFHQDULRVVXFKDVµI am sometimes more convinced 
by what might be there than by what I actually see¶ (Aardema et al. 2005). However, 
affirming statements like these are insufficient to show that the imaginary narratives of OCD 
sufferers are grounded in the delusional commitments rather than the reverse. Becoming 
convinced of the presence of the harm could be the ultimate product of constant obsession. 
As mentioned above with regards to the Dysfunctional Belief MRGHOZKHQRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQLV
FRQVWDQWO\RFFXSLHGZLWK WKRXJKWVRI WKHKDUPRFFXUULQJRQH¶V VHQVHRI LWV OLNHOLKRRGZLOO
become exaggerated. 
 
Meanwhile, by appealing to distinctive beliefs, the inference based approach seems 
vulnerable to the same difficulties that beset the dysfunctional belief model. 1) Factors about 
background environment or upbringing are insufficiently distinctive to make sense of the 
development of such core beliefs, and 2) there is a significant population of OCD sufferers 
who do not express definite beliefs. An additional problem specific to the inverse inference 
approach is that OCD sufferers often switch the themes of their obsession over the course of 
their lives (Summerfeldt et al. 2005). An individual obsessed with ordering at one time in life 
may become obsessed with violating taboos, or with contagion threats at another. Thus again, 
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we should be on the lookout for an underlying factor that is driving the generation of the 
doubts. 
 
We are left with the key claim that OCD sufferers display a disordered inference or reasoning 
style; that they are biased towards the confirmation of their imaginary harms. However it is 
common practice to begin with a hypothesis and then search for ways to confirm or 
disconfirm that hypothesis (where confirmation bias is common in the general population). 
Indeed, Dar 2004 presents evidence of no difference in confirmation bias across OCD and 
control groups. Pélissier and O¶Connor (2002) also find no differences in a deductive 
reasoning task. What both studies instead find is greater doubt in OCD sufferers compared to 
controls when questions are repeated, or when alternative solutions are presented. This 
evidence is more compatible with the appeal to uncertainty problems that we defend below. 
 
Finally, it does not seem to be the case that OCD sufferers have a distinctive vulnerability to 
magical thinking. For instance, magical thinking is not required to generate worries about 
contagious surfaces in public spaces. However, when one is highly disposed to find some 
source of possible harm, relatively implausible suggestions are likely to become tempting. In 
this way, magical thinking could certainly DJJUDYDWH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V WHQGHQF\ WR GHYHORS
obsessions, since it massively multiplies the potential availability of harms.  
 
Overall, we do not find evidence that exclusively supports the Inference-based Approach, and 
WKHUH¶V HYLGHQFH that OCD subjects have reasoning capacities that are comparable to the 
general population (though we can allow that some of the most severe or chronic cases could 
be compounded by reasoning difficulties). Rather the most interesting, and in our opinion, 
correct aspect of O¶Connor¶s theory is specifically that the OCD sufferer is not merely 
inflicted by thoughts of a distressing nature, but is in some sense actively searching for 
sources of harm.  
 
O¶Connor and colleagues are right to doubt the claim of the dysfunctional belief model that 
an exaggerated emotional response to ordinary intrusions is sufficient to generate extreme 
and unusual obsessive concerns. Being highly distressed by a thought seems sufficient to 
attract one¶s attention to it, and thereby generate its repetition. But it does not predict the 
elaboration of the thought. Rather, elaborative rumination is an indirect result. The subject 
may question whether they are in fact a terrible person for thinking the intrusive thought. Or 
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they may worry that they might have another terrible thought and generate possible scenarios 
as a result. That is, elaborative thinking is more directly the consequence of trying to defend 
one¶s hypothesis against contradictory considerations, or exploring what ideas may satisfy a 
general theme or concern. 
 
By active search, we do not mean that the OCD sufferer has reflectively endorsed intentions 
to think about harm. Rather they display a definite attentional bias. There is a more or less 
conscious mental search activity in which the subject explores their environment or 
conceptual network for items that satisfy certain selection criteria. The selection criteria 
might initially take the general formµwhat is the worst thing WKDWFRXOGKDSSHQWRPH"¶ or, 
µwhat is the worsW WKLQJ , FRXOG GR"¶ But if one is searching for harms, one is likely to 
eventually come across specific sources of harm that are particularly difficult to falsify. Thus 
it is predictable that the obsessive latches onto certain themes such as the presence of 
invisible germs, supernatural means of causation, or one¶s own ability to harm others.8 These 
themes act like natural basins of attraction in the active search for harms. And at this point the 
mental search becomes fixated on how that specific harm may be brought about. 
 
The appeal to active search helps to explain why OCD sufferers are prone to distressing 
thoughts regardless of the situation they are currently in. It also helps to explain why the 
intrusive thoughts can acquire such extreme and specific content. But since we have rejected 
the claim that the OCD subjects are driven by the commitment to any particular belief, we 
require an alternate driver of the search for harms. Our partial suggestion is that feelings of 
anxiety dispose individuals to search for ways to test or confirm their safety. Anxiety 
sensitivity is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate OCD symptoms, but it takes us some 
way towards explaining the active search for harms. 
 
Under normal circumstances, we feel anxiety when it seems to us that something bad may 
happen. One also tends to be uncertain about whether or not the harm will occur (when you 
are sure that a harm is upcoming, you feel definite fear or panic instead). The typical response 
pattern of anxiety includes heightened physiological and behavioural preparedness, and most 
notably for us, cognitive responses of increased vigilance and attempts to resolve uncertainty 
                                                 
8
 Consider; how do you kQRZ\RXFRXOGQ¶WKDUP\RXUFKLOG"'R\RXDWWHPSW WRGRVRDQG WKHQ ILQGRXW\RX
FDQ¶W JR WKURXJK ZLWK LW" :RXOGQ¶W HYHQ WKDW H[SHULHQFH IDLO WR GLVFRQILUP WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW \RX PLJKW
overcome that constraint if you really tried, or that your self-constraining processes might somehow fail you? 
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about possible harms ,I RQH¶V VHQVH RI DQ[LHW\ LV enduring, this cognitive response can 
include speculations about ways in which a harm may be brought about. For instance, if 
\RX¶UH DQ[LRXV DERXWZKHUH \RXU FKLOGUHQDUH \RXPD\EHJLQ WR VSHFXODWHPRUH DQGPRUH
about terrible things that might have happened to them. 
 
Thus feelings of anxiety are sufficient to motivate the search for harms. Moreover, anxiety 
JHQHUDWHVDQDWWHQWLRQDOELDVWRZDUGVWKRXJKWV WKDWFRQILUPRQH¶VVHQVHRIYXOQHUDELOLW\'H
Jong and Vroling (2013) present converging lines of evidence for reasoning biases in the 
general population that support the confirmation of possible threats, while ignoring or 
UHVSRQGLQJ VORZHU WR GLVFRQILUPDWLRQV RI WKUHDWV ZKDW KH FDOOV WKH µEHWWHU VDIH WKDQ VRUU\¶
strategy).9 In particular, de Jong and Vroling show that subjects with anxiety disorders show 
these same biases towards objects that healthy subjects do not (e.g. phobic threats, signals of 
social disapproval).  
 
The fact that the OCD obsessions all take the general theme of how things could go 
catastrophically wrong is already compelling evidence that anxiety is playing a role in the 
construction of the doubts. Anxiety is pushing the subject towards fixating on one or other 
source of vulnerability. Given that the most straightforward variety of anxiety concerns one¶s 
personal vulnerability to harm, the disposition would presumably have to interact with the 
particular sensitivities of patients towards the attitudes of others, or their responsibilities for 
others, to make sense of obsessive themes regarding harm to others and taboo-violation. Yet 
these different sensitivities seem easy enough to accommodate within ordinary personality 
variations. 
 
A dispositional sensitivity towards anxiety is highly compatible with the observed co-
morbidity rates with anxiety disorders that were noted in section 2. It is also compatible with 
the display of various concerns highlighted by the dysfunctional belief model. If one is 
feeling anxious on a day to day basis, one may feel a greater need for certainty or control 
more generally, and thereby more readily endorse the validity of such concerns (cf. Steketee 
et al. 2002). It would be particularly noteworthy if the presence of anxiety in children or 
teenagers prior to the development of OCD could be established.10 
                                                 
9
 See also Yiend (2010), who reviews a large number of experimental confirmations of this attentional bias. 
10
 *ULVKDPHWDOILQGµQHJDWLYHHPRWLRQDOLW\¶WREHDSUHGLFWRURI2&'GHYHORSPHQWEXWFRQWUROVDJDLnst 
anxiety disorders. More generally, it seems that evidence is hard to come by partly because OCD has commonly 
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Yet even if anxiety sensitivity was found in a majority of children who went on to develop 
OCD, we do not believe that OCD can be reduced to the influence of anxiety alone on the 
active search for harms. In particular, appealing to anxiety without additional cognitive 
factors will not allow us to distinguish between OCD and generalised anxiety disorder or 
social anxiety disorder. Recall that OCD involves elements of compulsive behaviour, and in 
many cases the endorsement of certain beliefs (such as the need to control thoughts) that we 
do not find in anxiety disorders. This is the reason why the DSM-5 has distinguished a 
separate category of OCD spectrum disorders. As such, while we recognize the important 
role that anxiety is likely to play, we believe there is a distinctive cognitive disorder 
underlying the development of OCD. This disorder seems to interact with different kinds of 
anxiety sensitivity in the majority of cases, but in some cases, it can generate OCD symptoms 
independently of any special sensitivity to anxiety. 
 
5. Intrusive Uncertainty 
So far we have reason to believe that anxiety can stimulate increased vigilance and mental 
search activities, and can explain ZK\ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V REVHVVLons tend towards themes of 
harm. However, we need an additional cognitive factor to explain why OCD sufferers fail to 
be convinced by evidence contradicting their worries, or checking procedures that should 
resolve their doubts. It would also help if this cognitive factor could make sense of what is 
triggering or sustaining feelings of anxiety. 
 
Our proposal is that individuals with OCD suffer from a general cognitive problem relating to 
uncertainty. A constant and intrusive sense of uncertainty is plausibly a feature that is 
consistent across the various sub-types of OCD and checking compulsions. If you are 
uncertain whether your hands are clean for instance, then it makes sense to check further by 
washing them again. Similarly, if you are uncertain whether you have unknowingly run 
someone over with your FDUDVRQH2&'VXIIHUHUUHSRUWHGLQ2¶&RQQRUand Robillard 1995: 
894) you must carefully check if such an incident could have occurred. Again, if you are 
uncertain about whether or not \RX¶UH a paedophile, you may need to check whether or not 
                                                                                                                                                        
been classified as an anxiety disorder, implying that diagnoses of anxiety in childhood may already include 
cases of OCD. 
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you get aroused by thoughts of paedophilia. Or if you are uncertain about whether or not 
\RX¶UHDJRRG&KULVWLDQ\RXPD\check by rehearsing certain religious rituals. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, uncertainty about harms is sufficient to generate 
anxiety. Anxiety also motivates the individual to resolve uncertainties. Thus a cognitive 
problem with uncertainty bears a definite affinity with anxiety, explaining why it should 
interact most powerfully with this emotion, rather than others. This lends some prima facie 
plausibility to the thesis.  
 
Meanwhile, empirical support for this hypothesis comes from two sets of evidence. The first 
and most direct evidence comes from a large number of cognitive tests indicating an 
increased susceptibility to uncertainty in OCD individuals across a variety of domains. A 
second source of evidence comes from studies indicating increased neural activity related to 
the processing of error in OCD individuals. This evidence is less direct, since it relies on an 
argument that error signalling will be experienced by the individual as feelings of uncertainty. 
But crucially, in neither case is this evidence specifically related to the anxious concerns that 
beset OCD sufferers, allowing us to identify an independent cognitive function at work. 
 
A distinctive susceptibility to uncertainty in OCD sufferers was discovered when examining 
whether individuals with OCD suffer memory impairments. An impaired memory would be a 
plausible explanation for the checker sub-group of OCD sufferers in particular, given that it 
should be extremely easy for a person endowed with normal episodic memory to confirm 
whether or not the oven has been switched off, or the front door locked by simple recall of 
their recent actions. However, across a large number of studies (reviewed in Muller and 
Roberts 2005; Olley et al. 2007; Harkin and Kessler 2011) it has been found that OCD 
sufferers display no consistent pattern of memory impairments. What is most robustly 
confirmed is a definite lack of confidence in memories. Other studies have found that the 
distrust of OCD sufferers is not confined to episodic memory. It also appears in tests of 
general knowledge (Dar 2004), and even ongoing perceptual experience (van den Hout and 
Kindt 2004; Hermans et al. 2008).  
 
Since the reliability of OCD sufferers¶ PHPRULHV DQG DWWHQWLRQ is comparable to controls, 
some psychologists have suggested that the problem is metacognitive; that is, sufferers¶ 
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awareness of their own thoughts is dysfunctional in some way.11 This suggestion is 
comparable to certain versions of the dysfunctional belief model that highlight dysfunctional 
attitudes about thoughts (e.g. Wells 1997; Clark 2004). The difference here is that the distrust 
of thought is not believed to be a consequence of dysfunctional appraisal (at least primarily) 
but rather has something to do with the very mechanism RIEHFRPLQJDZDUHRIRQH¶VRZQ
thoughts. For instance, Hermans et al. (2008) suggest that OCD sufferers are more likely to 
experience metacognitive distrust as the ironic result of checking too frequently. This may be 
because heightened attention reveals additional details to the experience that need to be 
verified if one is to be really sure. Alternatively, repeated checking leads to conceptual 
generalisation about the task, inhibiting the richness of the individual perceptual check (cf. 
Van den Hout and Kindt 2003; Dar 2004). 
 
However, we do not construe the problem with uncertainty as specifically relating to 
metacognition. 3ULRU WR DWWDLQLQJ LQVLJKW LQWR WKHLU FRQGLWLRQ DQG UHDOLVLQJ WKDW LW¶V WKH
uncertainty itself which is the problem, OCD sufferers are focused precisely on the first order 
issue of whether or not the door is locked, or they have HIV, or they could harm their 
children, and so on. Moreover, it seems that at least some groups of OCD sufferers have 
problems monitoring their actions, rather than their thoughts (e.g. Belayachi and Der Linden 
2010).12 Again, this does not suggest a specifically metacognitive problem. 
 
Our proposal is simply that there is a dedicated cognitive mechanism for signalling 
uncertainty that is overactive in the OCD sufferer. Because the neural signal of uncertainty is 
conceived as physically independent of uncertainty regarding a specific task, we hypothesise 
that the activation of this signal could well be the direct physical realiser of the feeling that 
things are just not right.13 However, if there is a particular intentional act that is currently 
                                                 
11
 Metacognition, defined as broadly as possible E\ -RsOOH 3URXVW   LV µthe set of capacities through 
which an operating cognitive subsystem is evaluated or represented by another subsystem in a context-sensitive 
ZD\¶ 
12
 Lazarov et al. (2012) argue that OCD sufferers have a reduced sense of conviction for all internal states- 
cognitive, affective and bodily. They suggest that this is due to attenuated access to such states. Bédarda et al. 
(2009) observe a compatible pattern of slower motor skills in OCD sufferers. However the evidence of poorer 
performance on bodily tasks may also due to over-correction encouraged by general uncertainty. 
13
 7KLVQRWLRQDOLJQVZHOOZLWKZKDWDUHGHVFULEHGDVHSLVWHPLFRUµQRHWLF¶IHHOLQJVZKLFKLQFlude the feeling of 
NQRZLQJVRPHWKLQJDQGWKHIHHOLQJWKDWDIDFWLVRQWKHµWLSRI\RXUWRQJXH¶,WLVFODLPHGWKDWVXFKIHHOLQJVSOD\
an important role in mental actions such as remembering, planning, or deciding, by providing an intuitive, non-
conceptuDOIHHGEDFNRQWKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRIRQH¶VPHQWDOHFRQRP\HJ3URXVW'RNLFLQSDUWLFXODU
emphasizes the highly separable and contingent relationship between the feeling of knowing and the thought 
contents with which this feeling is associated. 
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salient for the individual, we think that the sense of uncertainty is likely to be associated with 
that action by the individual, as a form of post-hoc rationalisation of the uncertainty signal. 
As a result, the individual can experience uncertainty about their intentional behaviour across 
a variety of different domains. This includes mental actions such as deliberately recalling a 
memory, or deliberately paying attention to something. It can also include the compliance 
with norms (such as being a moral person, or keeping clean), given that the intention to 
comply with these norms can at certain times be consciously salient for the individual. Thus 
despite the fact that different cognitive mechanisms are most likely responsible for 
monitoring all these different sorts of actions, if our intentions to act in such ways can be 
equally consciously experienced, they can be equally consciously experienced as uncertain. 
 
We believe that this suggestion best captures the cross domain nature of the uncertainty 
problem observed in OCD sufferers, as well as its potential independence from particular 
worries in the case of µnot just right¶ feelings.14 Attributing the sense of uncertainty to the 
breakdown of a specific neuro-biological system can plausibly accommodate the role of 
genetic factors, or disease in the development of the disorder.15 It also makes sense of why 
the disorder is relatively independent of life-history factors, and can be resistant to cognitive 
behavioural therapies. 
 
More support for the role of an independent uncertainty signal comes from evidence of 
increased neural activity related to error detection in OCD sufferers. To cite some relevant 
studies, Riesel et al. (2011) found increased error-related negativity signals (ERNs) in OCD 
sufferers and first-degree relatives where Hanna et al. (2012) observe increased ERNs in 
paediatric OCD. Fitzgerald et al. (2005) observes hyper-activation proportional to OCD 
severity in the anterior cingulate cortex, which has been correlated with error detection and 
management.16 Harrison et al. (2009) similarly observe hyperactivity in corticostriatal 
networks incorporating the anterior cingulate cortex, the orbitofrontal striatum and the basal 
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 7KRXJKQRWHWKDWWRJHQHUDWHFKHFNLQJUHVSRQVHVWKHµQRWMXVWULJKW¶FDVHVPXVWVWLOOOLQNXQFHUWDLQW\WRVRPH
action that they then check, potentially as a form of testing feelings of uncertainty. 
15
 The DSM-5 (2013: 240) notes that up to 10% of cases of early onset OCD have been associated with a 
streptococcal infection (PANDAS) known to cause inflammation in the basal ganglia (cf. Abramowitz 2009: 
493). The basal ganglia are generally correlated with motor control. 
16
 Carter and Van Veen (2007) review a number of studies that link activity in the anterior cingulate cortex with 
the detection of error and representational conflicts. This structure is observed to trigger further activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, correlated with enhanced cognitive flexibility to changing task demands. 
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ganglia. Note that increased activity is found both during error-related task activities and 
when at rest.17 
  
Error detection in these studies typically refers to activity observed when the individual 
makes a mistake like hitting an arrow key that fails to match the direction of an arrow shown 
on a computer screen. So what has this got to do with the sense of uncertainty? First, we note 
that processing of both error and uncertainty have been linked with the same areas of the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g. Rushworth and Behrens 2008; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012; Asp et 
al. 2013). Second, it is highly plausible that if one receives a signal of error without an 
obvious cause, it is like receiving an email from your boss with the subject line: µ8UJHQW
SUREOHPZLWK\RXUZRUN¶ You will immediately wonder what you could have done wrong, 
thus manifesting uncertainty (cf. Aouizerate et al. 2004). Third, and most important, there are 
good theoretical reasons to believe that uncertainty is itself a signal of potential error. That 
is, whereas HUURU LQYROYHV D GHILQLWH FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ RQH¶V intention and what has been 
REVHUYHGXQFHUWDLQW\LVZKHUHWKHVXEMHFW¶VFXUUHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRnal state is compatible with 
two (or more) representations that mutually conflict, thus threatening error. A signal of error 
or uncertainty can then trigger information gathering or reasoning processes aimed at 
resolving the conflict by strengthening the preference for one side of the conflict, and 
inhibiting the other (cf. Rushworth  and Behrens 2008). All this might potentially be achieved 
without the conscious involvement of the individual. But if the representations under 
consideration are already closH WR DWWHQWLRQ GXH WR WKHLU VDOLHQFH WR WKH VXEMHFW¶V FXUUHQW
situation, the call for further resources may well cross a threshold in capturing the full 
attention of the subject. We hope to see more focused neurological and psychological studies 
that confirm this hypothesis.18 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that even though signals of uncertainty may be highly 
persistent in OCD sufferers, it need not compel confirmatory or exploratory checking of 
every single thought or action that they have. A crucial additional factor concerns the degree 
to which uncertainties are tolerated, and this tolerance can be domain specific. In domains of 
particular concern to the OCD sufferer (such as the wellbeing of his or her children) stricter 
                                                 
17
 Notably, under-activity in the frontostriatal pathway (including the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate 
cortex) is observed in ADHD (Abramovitch et al. 2013), suggesting an opposition in the two disorders related to 
the avoidance of error. 
18
 For evidence of distinct conscious and non-conscious responses to conflict signalling see Charles et al. 
(2013). 
21 
 
criteria for certainty are likely to be required. This may be understood mechanistically as the 
QDUURZLQJRIWKHWROHUDQFHUDQJHVIRUZKDWFRXQWVDVDµULJKW¶DQVZHUDQGZLWKKROGLQJDVVHQW
from representations falling outside of those tolerances. So it is this tolerance, in combination 
with excessive signals of uncertainty that we suggest is responsible for the different sorts of 
obsessions that can beset the life of the OCD sufferer. 
 
By appeal to both a basic problem with intrusive uncertainty, and a domain-relative tolerance 
for this experience, we can explain why OCD sufferers tend to gravitate towards certain 
distinctive obsessive themes. We suppose that even if one suffers from strong and persistent 
signals of uncertainty, this need only motivate checking for highly salient concerns, 
particularly those relating to potential harm (i.e. where one has mild or merited feelings of 
anxiety). Meanwhile, milder signals of uncertainty may require more definite anxiety 
sensitivities to compel checking. So in a large proportion of OCD sufferers, the sense of 
uncertainty may interact with different varieties of anxiety sensitivity, such that one is prone 
to move from the sense of uncertainty to conscious evaluation only in circumstances that one 
tends to be anxious about. If you are disposed towards social anxiety for instance, a sense of 
uncertainty accompanying any thought regarding the attitudes of others towards you will 
more readily trigger evaluation (ultimately being attracted towards obsessions regarding the 
violation of social or moral norms). The same goes for anxiety sensitivities towards personal 
harm (leading to contagion and other harm-to-VHOI REVHVVLRQV RU RQH¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU
others (leading to harm-to-other obsessions). 
 
Some final clarifications about this model are important. We are not claiming that OCD 
sufferers are more intolerant of uncertainty than individuals with anxiety problems. 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been linked about equally with OCD and Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder (see Gentes and Ruscio 2011 for a meta-analysis). We are also not claiming that 
OCD suffers generally feel a higher intensity of uncertainty, or that they are less capable of 
making sound judgements of their level of certainty about some fact, at least initially. An 
experiment by Shachar et al. (2013) examining uncertainty judgements indicates that on both 
of these measures OCD sufferers are comparable to controls. Our claim is rather that OCD 
sufferers more frequently experience reports of being uncertain, many of which are false or 
inappropriate to the situation. So the crucial experimental studies that will allow our 
hypothesis to be potentially falsified will investigate the relative frequency with which 
individuals with OCD question (unprompted) their level of certainty for salient matters, 
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relative to controls. Then, having obsessed about a harm over an extended period of time, the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V sense of the probability of that harm may well become distorted (as we discussed 
in section 3). HoweveULW¶VQRWWKHPHUHIDFWof adopting a poor checking strategy that makes 
OCD sufferers more susceptible to doubt (as others have claimed). Our view is that OCD 
sufferers repeatedly check because they are plagued by persistent, intrusive signals of 
uncertainty that demand further checking. 
 
(Figure 1: A schema for the Intrusive Uncertainty Model of OCD- to be placed about 
here. See end of paper) 
 
6. Accommodating the Various Observations about OCD 
Considerations about the interaction of uncertainty problems with different anxiety 
sensitivities allow us to accommodate the patterns of comorbidity with anxiety sensitivity 
observed in the OCD population. The checking subtype (involving a very strong disposition 
for uncertainty signals) allows for a pure form of OCD that requires no special sensitivity to 
anxiety (i.e. no anxiety disorder), where other OCD subtypes involve interactions with 
definite anxiety sensitivities. We are also able to accommodate the phenomenology of 
intrusiveness more effectively than other models. Our model is comparable to the Inference-
Based Approach with respect to the active search for harms. Yet unlike the Inference-Based 
Approach, we appeal to a neurobiological signal of error/uncertainty that the individual 
cannot directly control, the function of which is to trigger confirmation processes. When 
FRPELQHGZLWK WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶VDQ[LHW\VHQVLWLYLWLHV LW LV IDLU WRVD\ WKDW the subject is very 
strongly pushed, if not compelled to explore possible harms (we will explore the degree of 
resistance to reasoned control in the following section). 
 
Our model can also account for the presence of the various dysfunctional beliefs in OCD 
subjects. An intolerance of uncertainty is a predictable consequence of the problem we 
outline. Although cognitive problems with certainty must be distinguished from emotional 
distress taken in uncertainty, it is understandable that subjects find the habitual signalling of 
uncertainty to be distressing when it attaches to personal concerns. Thus they strongly desire 
to achieve greater certainty about such matters, in the hope that this will remove the feelings 
of uncertainty. It is similarly predictable that an over-estimation of threat results from being 
unable to achieve certainty regarding the things that matter to them most, particularly when 
intensified by anxiety sensitivities that are present in most (though not all) individuals with 
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OCD. Finally, constant intrusions encourage the OCD sufferers to develop metacognitive 
concerns about their thoughts. Such concerns are particularly pernicious because they 
motivate the individual to check their thoughts, leading to their repetition and elaboration 
rather than their dismissal. 
 
Thus the Intrusive Uncertainty Model can account for the formation of beliefs found in the 
self-report data. Our model however has the advantage that it need not appeal to any unusual 
emphasis on personal responsibility in the developmental environment to account for the 
formation and preservation of these attitudes. Yet we can certainly allow that if an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V HQYLURQPHQW KHDYLO\ HPSKDVLVHV WKHLU YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR HUURU or the negative 
consequences of error, this could either trigger the disorder or intensify a pre-existing 
susceptibility to the disorder. 
 
Overall, the Intrusive Uncertainty Model can accommodate the evidence appealed to by other 
models. Yet it conceives the over-thinking that we observe in obsessive compulsive disorder 
in a different way to other models. The Intrusive Uncertainty Model conceives OCD as 
essentially a response to uncertainty. Like the Inference-Based Approach, this is taken to 
include suppositions regarding possible sources of harm. However, unlike the Inference-
Based Approach, generating suppositions is understood as a variety of checking behaviour, 
rather than a means to confirm a deep seated conviction. Furthermore, the Inference-Based 
Approach claims that OCD sufferers ignore the evidence provided by the environment, since 
they are too wrapped up in their imagined narratives. In contrast the Intrusive Uncertainty 
Model allows for checking behaviours (including compulsive washing) that are 
straightforwardly aimed at resolving the issue one way or the other, and only fail to deliver 
certainty (without very deliberate behavioural interventions) due to persistent signals of 
uncertainty. Endless checking is thus central to the Intrusive Uncertainty Model of OCD in a 
way that we do not find in other models, and in this way seems truer to the phenomenology 
of the disorder. 
 
Finally the Intrusive Uncertainty Model accommodates experimental findings that do not sit 
so well with either the Dysfunctional Belief Model or the Inference-Based Approach. Having 
delusional commitments or a poor reasoning style should not make one susceptible to 
XQFHUWDLQW\DERXWRQH¶VDELOLW\WRUHFDOOJHQHUDONQRZOHGJHIDFWVIRULQVWDQFH (Dar 2004 cited 
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above). And it is hard to see how having dysfunctional concerns about the need to control 
RQH¶VWKRXJKWVcould achieve this either. 
 
7. Implications for Thought Control 
7KLV DUWLFOH KDV IRFXVHG RQ D GLVRUGHU WKDW LV NQRZQ WR XQGHUPLQH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V RYHUDOO
thinking efficiency. OCD can cause the individual to become locked in cycles of paralysing 
doubt, and even make them susceptible to irrational beliefs concerning personal 
trustworthiness. However our Intrusive Uncertainty Model has nuanced implications for 
thought control. We have identified several distinct stages in the generation and exacerbation 
of obsessive worries. Some of these stages are likely to be more resistant to reasoned control 
than others. 
 
First, we have argued that enduring anxiety (sustained by constant signals of 
error/uncertainty) disposes the individual to actively search for harms. Although it is part of 
the function of anxiety to search for harms, this response seems to be strongly motivated 
rather than absolutely compelled. Normally when undergoing emotions, we are able to inhibit 
or redirect at least our overt behavioural responses, and this capacity may also be true of 
certain cognitive responses. For example, &%7WHFKQLTXHVRIWHQUHFRPPHQGµacknowledging' 
intrusive worries without catastrophizing their presence and thereby IDVWHQLQJRQH¶V attention 
upon them (e.g. Bishop et al. 2004; Hoffman et al. 2010). In a similar vein we suggest that 
the subject can acknowledge the anxious uncertainty they have about some harm, but resist 
searching for novel ways in which harm may be brought about. This should prevent the 
subject from gravitating towards obsessions that are particularly hard to disconfirm. 
 
Note that the existence of a population of OCD sufferers who experience only µnot just right¶ 
feelings indicates that elaborative thinking about harms may be avoided. However, this 
subgroup may have milder anxiety sensitivities than OCD sufferers who display more 
elaborate obsessions. Thus future experiments should investigate the extent to which novel 
imaginings can be resisted on command and the degree to which this is proportional to 
anxiety levels. 
 
Another key stage proposed by our model is a post-hoc association made between the signal 
of uncertainty and intentional behaviour that is currently salient for the individual (including 
mental acts). Note that the normal function of the uncertainty/error signal is to be triggered by 
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represented errors or ambiguities. If the uncertainty signal is triggered independently, the 
subject will experience an illusion of uncertainty attaching to a current concern. This seems 
analogous to certain emotional illusions where physiological cues of emotion get 
PLVDWWULEXWHGWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVLWXDWLRQHJ'XWWRQand Aron¶Vfamous shaky bridge 
experiment). However, it is worth emphasising that the repetitive co-occurrence of the sense 
of uncertainty with a particular concern should considerably reinforce any associative link. 
 
Given WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V salient intentions and the sense of uncertainty are functionally 
distinct, it seems theoretically possible for the association to be resisted. As in emotional 
misattribution (e.g. Storbeck and Stefanucci 2014), reflective awareness of what is happening 
may make a difference. Most importantly, the individual retains the capacity to reason that 
such associations are not valid. Thus cognitive behavioural therapy could encourage the 
individual with OCD to note the signal of uncertainty without regarding it as a reliable. 
5HFDOO DOVR 2¶&RQQRU DQG FROOHDJXHV WKHUDSHXWLF VWUDWHJ\ LQ ZKLFK WKH LQGLYLGXDO ZDV
encouraged to develop positive imaginative narratives in order to replace harm-confirming 
QDUUDWLYHV ,Q D VLPLODU ZD\ LW LV SRVVLEOH WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V IHHOLQJ RI uncertainty be 
deliberately associated with some emotionally neutral or positive narrative instead. 
 
Finally, and unique to our model, it has been crucial for making sense of the intrusive nature 
RIWKH2&'VXIIHUHU¶VGRXEWVWKDWWKHHUURUVLJQDOOLQJV\VWHPfunctions independently of the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQVFLRXVFRQWURO2IFRXUVHZHFDQFRQVFLRXVO\FKRRVHWRTXHVWLRQKRZFHrtain 
we are, but much more frequently, we will simply be struck by uncertainty. It is the 
breakdown of this mechanism that we most readily link with a genetic predisposition,19 and 
that we take to be the least susceptible to reasoned control. The sub-personal system calls on 
our attention. It will most likely succeed in grabbing our attention if the uncertainty is linked 
with a matter of current concern. Anxiety will be most likely triggered if the uncertainty is 
linked with a potential harm, and anxiety will reinforce attention towards the representation 
of harm. Without a general theory of attention we cannot decisively say that the attention will 
be compelled, however these are clearly powerful attractors on attention. In healthy cases, 
this system plays an important role in helping the individual to appropriately manage his or 
her concerns. But it seems our capacity to modify its functioning if it ever fails to align with 
our reflectively endorsed goals is very limited. 
                                                 
19
 Though disease and environmental factors also remain possible causes. 
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Moreover, the incapacity for OCD sufferers to dismiss worries that they know to be highly 
unlikely or irrational is not due to any distinctive absence of a direct system for withdrawing 
attention. No direct mechanism for withdrawing attention seems to exist.20 Rather the normal 
procedure is to become distracted by something else. In normal cases of uncertainty, 
distraction may be aided by the weakening of the uncertainty signal, should checking 
procedures manage to confirm matters one way or the other. Yet checking seems largely 
ineffective in OCD sufferers. Thus the system will continue to call on their attention, and will 
only be reinforced by distress and conscious attempts at thought control. 
 
We shall conclude, however, with a novel positive prediction: if we are right that intrusive 
uncertainty is at the root of the disorder, and that uncertainty is identifiable with error 
signalling, then any technique that is effective at reducing error signalling should have a 
significant beneficial impact on OCD severity. Direct pharmaceutical interventions are the 
most likely candidate for such effects.21 However, it is our hope that this model will stimulate 
novel clinical approaches. 
Department of Philosophy 
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Figure 1: A schema for the Intrusive Uncertainty Model of OCD 
 
This schema outlines a hypothesised set of causal dependencies for OCD. The key problem we identify at the 
root of the disorder is hyperactivity of the error signal function. This fuels a positive feedback loop between 
uncertainty, anxiety and checking, depicted in the lower-left quadrant of the diagram. The process relies on the 
individual associating a feeling of uncertainty with some intentional action. Intentional actions can include 
compliance with personal and moral norms as well as metacognitive norms regarding thought control. Checking 
responses can include both bodily and cognitive actions (e.g. the search for harms). In healthy individuals, 
checking has a tendency to reduce ordinary sources of error or uncertainty and thereby halt the entire loop. 
Checking may not always succeed however, and may sometimes be counter-productive (e.g. in revealing new 
things to be uncertain about). Note also that an anxiety disorder will tend to increase concerns (potentially to 
dysfunctional levels) and thereby encourage uncertainty-based anxiety. However an anxiety disorder is not 
necessary for OCD to develop. Awareness of the disorder can also encourage dysfunctional levels of concern to 
develop. Please note that not all features of anxiety disorders are included in this diagram. 
 
